Evidence from Swedish Matched Employer-Employee Data (1996–2015)
Daniel Halvarsson
The Ratio Institute, Stockholm | daniel.halvarsson@ratio.se
"Attracting and retaining talent is essential for innovation, economic growth, and competitiveness. Countries that do not join the global competition for highly skilled workers risk falling behind."
— OECD, Talent Attractiveness (2023)
The dominating narrative in the policy debate have resulted in favorable visa regimes, tax incentives, and fast-track permits.
The argument goes:
What about productivity?
Does hiring foreign experts actually translate into productivity gains inside the firm? What does the evidence say?
1. Aggregate & Regional Studies
2. Firm-Level — But Not TFP
3. Total factor productivity
"Less work, until recently, has examined whether these linkages translate to the firm setting: does hiring more skilled immigrants improve firm-level innovation, productivity, and performance?"
— Glennon (2024, Journal of Economic Perspectives)
This paper: Estimates the direct effect of hiring foreign experts on firm TFP, using rich Swedish employer-employee data using an event-study designs.
$Y_{it}$ = value added; $s_{it}$ = average skill level; $F(I_{it}, U_{it})$ = labor aggregate of domestic and foreign workers; $K_{it}$ = capital stock; $A_{it}$ = TFP (Ruffner & Siegenthaler, 2017).
Hiring foreign experts ($\uparrow U_{it}$) can affect the firm through four channels:
1. Labor input $F(I_{it}, U_{it})$
More workers $\Rightarrow$ more output (provided foreign labor is not a perfect substitute for domestic workers). If substitutes, crowding out (Borjas & Doran, 2012). If complements, positive growth effects.
2. Skill composition $s_{it}$
Hiring highly qualified experts raises the average skill level of the workforce, increasing effective labor input beyond the number of employees.
3. Capital $K_{it}$
Indirect effects through complementarity with existing machinery and equipment, or direct effects if foreign labor attracts foreign investment.
4. TFP $A_{it}$ ← this paper's focus
The residual: international networks, management & organization, brand, technology adoption, absorptive capacity. These cannot be attributed to labor or capital alone.
Foreign workers refers to labor outside Sweden that migrates to Sweden for work, including Swedish returnees and migrants from countries both inside and outside the EU/EEA.
A foreign worker is classified as an expert if:
The income threshold corresponds to the level at which foreign workers automatically qualify for the Swedish Expert Tax relief (comparable to Malchow-Møller et al., 2019, for Danish experts).
Why an income-based definition?
The analysis draws on linked administrative microdata from Statistics Sweden (SCB), covering the full Swedish private sector (excl. financial) from 1996 to 2015.
| Individual-Level (LISA + Wage Statistics) |
|---|
| Age, gender, region of birth |
| Year of arrival (most recent migration) |
| Education level |
| Annual wage income (full population) |
| Monthly salary (stratified sample) |
| Occupation (SSYK codes) |
| Employer linkage (workplace ID) |
| Firm-Level (FDB — "Företagens ekonomi") |
|---|
| Value added, sales |
| Number of employees (by skill level) |
| Capital stock (tangible assets) |
| Intermediate inputs (materials) |
| Industry affiliation (2-digit SNI) |
| Export status |
Key advantage: The employer-employee link allows us to track exactly which firm hires which foreign expert, when they arrive, and to observe the firm's full production accounts (value added, capital, labor by skill) before and after the hire — enabling TFP estimation and DiD analysis at the firm level.
The definition isolates 2,329 unique foreign experts distributed across 1,278 private-sector firms.
| Top Sectors Employing Experts | % |
|---|---|
| Wholesale Trade (excl. motor vehicles) | 18.7% |
| Computer Programming & IT Consultancy | 9.7% |
| Head Office Activities & Business Consulting | 6.7% |
| Manufacture of Machinery & Equipment | 4.5% |
| Manufacture of Motor Vehicles | 3.6% |
Treatment group: Firms that for the first time hire a foreign expert directly from abroad, 2001–2015 (1,278 firms).
Comparison group: Firms in the same 2-digit sectors that never hire a foreign expert during the period.
A selection problem: Firms hiring experts are on average much larger, more capital-intensive, more internationalized, and already more productive:
| Characteristic (pre-hiring) | Treated | Other firms |
|---|---|---|
| Value Added (1,000 SEK) | 163,313 | 9,997 |
| Employees | 226 | 16 |
| Exporting | 69% | 21% |
| Share domestic experts | 3.1% | 0.4% |
Is this a problem? Not necessarily. Higher productivity levels in treated firms are fine — the DiD approach compares changes in productivity around the hiring event. The critical assumption is parallel trends: absent the hire, productivity would have evolved similarly in both groups.
To make this assumption more plausible, the model includes:
Step 1: Estimating firm-level TFP
Starting from a Cobb-Douglas production function for value added (in logs):
where $l_{it}$, $h_{it}$ = low- and high-skilled labor; $k_{it}$ = capital; $\omega_{it}$ = productivity observed by the firm; $\eta_{it}$ = unanticipated shocks.
Problem: OLS is biased because firms observe $\omega_{it}$ and adjust inputs accordingly (simultaneity).
Solution: Proxy variable methods (Wooldridge, 2009) — use intermediate inputs (materials) to proxy for $\omega_{it}$, estimated separately by 2-digit sector. TFP is then the residual: $\hat{a}_{it} = y_{it} - \hat{\beta}_K k_{it} - \hat{\beta}_L l_{it} - \hat{\beta}_H h_{it}$.
Step 2: Average treatment effect of the treated (conditional) — Local Projections DiD
Firms hire experts in different years (staggered treatment). Standard TWFE event studies can produce biased estimates when treatment effects vary across cohorts.
lpdid (Dube et al., 2023) avoids this by running separate cross-sectional regressions for each horizon $h$:
where $\Delta D_{it} = 1$ for newly treated firms and 0 for not-yet-treated or never-treated firms.
Intuition: By long-differencing ($t-1$ to $t+h$), firm fixed effects drop out. Each horizon $h$ uses a clean comparison — only firms that have not yet been treated serve as controls, avoiding the "bad comparison" problem of TWFE. The coefficient $\beta_h^{lpdid}$ traces out the dynamic treatment effect.
For comparison, average annual TFP growth in Swedish firms has been around 2% per year (Ekonomifakta).
| Event time | (1) No controls | (3) Preferred |
|---|---|---|
| $T_0-5$ | 0.033 (0.022) | 0.011 (0.022) |
| $T_0-4$ | 0.043* (0.021) | 0.025 (0.021) |
| $T_0-3$ | 0.019 (0.020) | 0.004 (0.020) |
| $T_0-2$ | 0.027 (0.017) | 0.019 (0.016) |
| $T_0-1$ | reference period | |
| $T_0$ | -0.020 (0.017) | 0.004 (0.016) |
| $T_0+1$ | 0.006 (0.019) | 0.038* (0.019) |
| $T_0+2$ | 0.029 (0.020) | 0.076*** (0.020) |
| $T_0+3$ | 0.065** (0.021) | 0.116*** (0.021) |
| $T_0+4$ | 0.052* (0.023) | 0.100*** (0.024) |
| $T_0+5$ | 0.053* (0.026) | 0.108*** (0.026) |
SE clustered at firm level. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$. Model (3) adds size, export, domestic expert share, and wage growth controls.
In a smaller firm, a single expert has more leverage to reshape organization, introduce new technologies, and open international networks. In large firms, the marginal impact of one hire is diluted across hundreds of employees.
Over half (53%) of the experts are Swedish-born individuals returning from abroad. When we exclude them:
Does the hiring of a foreign expert benefit the incumbent workforce?
Consistent with knowledge spillovers raising coworker productivity, and rent-sharing as firms become more profitable.
Key Conclusions:
Policy Relevance:
Policy impact: Cited in SOU 2025:3 "Skatteincitament för forskning och utveckling" — the Swedish Government inquiry reviewing the Expert Tax rules. The study's findings on the importance of international competence for Swedish productivity were used to inform proposed reforms.
Thank you!
Questions & comments welcome.